REFLEX ACTION 211 



and say, " I see a mountain in the distance." But it is 

 absurd to think that my sensation of sight, my feeling, can 

 resemble a huge material mass many miles away If I 

 journey towards the mountain till I pass over or round it my 

 sensations constantly change. The " real thing " presumably 

 does not change. Evidently here also I am dealing with a 

 succession of mental symbols. At best, therefore, I live in a 

 symbolic world, which my mind has constructed for me, and 

 into which no " real " thing nor the likeness of any real thing 

 can enter. If any real thing there be, it is more unlike the 

 mental symbols than the spoken word is unlike the written 

 word. Both the latter are sensations, the one of hearing, 

 the other of sight, and so can, in some sort, be compared. 

 But the real thing is not a sensation, and can in no way be 

 compared to one. The symbolic world constructed for me 

 by my mind, however, is " good enough " for me. It fills me 

 with interest, and with a mental reservation I accept it as 

 real. 



359. It is peopled by men and women who are certainly 

 as real as my own body, which, like them, I know only 

 through my senses. They have bodies much like mine, and 

 from their actions I infer that their minds, also, are much 

 like mine. A variety of reasons leads me to believe that 

 our minds are associated in some way, which I do not in the 

 least understand, with our brains. Since the brains are 

 alike and the minds are alike, I infer that the association is 

 probably one of cause and effect. That is, I suppose our 

 minds are alike because our brains are alike or vice versd. 

 The brains and the minds of children are somewhat unlike 

 mine. But the difference between our brains is not very 

 great, and I am able to remember my own childhood and so 

 can form a fairly clear idea of the mind of at least one child. 

 The difference between the brains of lower animals and my 

 own, however, is considerable; presumably the difference 

 between our minds is correspondingly great. Indeed I infer 

 by our actions that this is certainly so. 



360. Not only the brains but the sense organs of some 

 lower animals are very different from mine. For example, 

 our eyes may be constructed on unlike plans. Probably, 

 therefore, the world as symbolized to them by their senses 

 is different from the world as symbolized to me. In some 

 cases their sense organs appear more, and in other cases less, 

 perfect than mine. I have strong reason to suppose that the 

 information given to me by my senses is incomplete and 

 fragmentary. For instance, my sense of sight is able to avail 



