REFLEX ACTION 217 



pains. But the voluntary actions which we have just 

 considered, which depend directly on the pleasures or pains 

 which precede, accompany, or follow reflex actions, comprise 

 in the higher animals but a small proportion of the total 

 number. For example, the complex mass of actions by means 

 of which a man earns his livelihood have no immediate con- 

 nection with any reflexes. There is, however, great confusion 

 in the use of the terms reflex, involuntary, and voluntary. 

 Popularly and scientifically the words have not always the 

 same meanings. Often the latter term is restricted to 

 deliberate actions. Thus we are told that when a man 

 snatches his finger from a flame, into which he has in- 

 advertently introduced it, his action is involuntary (i. e. 

 reflex); whereas if he wilfully introduces it and keeps it 

 there his action is voluntary. Now no man wilfully (i.e. 

 deliberately) burns his finger unless his desire to burn it is 

 greater than his desire to preserve it unless he thinks that 

 the burning will ultimately lead to benefits which will out- 

 weigh the immediate suffering. He " chooses " the greater 

 of two desires, and in this case prefers remoter happiness to 

 present pain. We have only to examine the operations of 

 our own minds to be convinced of the reality of the truth 

 that when there is a conflict of desires, we are always 

 actuated by our stronger desires, the relative strength of 

 them being determined by the relative strength of the 

 corresponding pleasures or pains. When did any man ever 

 seek pain or avoid pleasure except to avert sharper pain or 

 to obtain greater pleasure ? The martyr suffers for the sake 

 of deeper and more lasting joys. The patriot risks danger 

 and death for his country, the parent toils for his child only 

 because his mind is so constituted that an opposite course 

 would be more painful. Our interest is awakened only 

 through the medium of our own pleasures and pains. For 

 example, did we not feel pain at the sight of another man's 

 sorrow, we should be quite indifferent to it. Prompted, 

 however, by our personal pain, we often stretch a helping 

 hand even when the action entails suffering on ourselves. 

 Invariably, even when our desires are most altruistic or 

 whimsical, we choose what is, or appears at the moment to 

 be, the lesser suffering or the greater pleasure. If, for in- 

 stance, in an endeavour to disprove this pleasure and pain 

 theory of voluntary action, a man bit his finger and then 

 declared that he had acted contrary to the dictates of 

 pleasure and pain, it would only be necessary to reply that 

 his pleasure in disproving the theory transcended in his 



