264 THE PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY 



extent a pre-organized bundle of such reactions they are as 

 fatal as sneezing and as exactly correlated to their special 

 excitants as it is to its own. Although the naturalist may, 

 for his own convenience, class these reactions under general 

 heads, he must not forget that in the animal it is a 

 particular sensation or perception or image that calls them 

 forth." i 



427. But reactions which, admittedly, are neither instinc- 

 tive nor reflex were called forth just as fatally by given 

 stimuli, provided always that they are the only stimuli in 

 operation, or the strongest stimuli of those in operation. The 

 desires we "acquire," however, are so multitudinous, their 

 operations consequently are so complicated, they vary so in 

 combination from day to day, that the appearance, the mere 

 appearance, of fatality is not so obvious. When our instincts 

 are opposed by our acquired incentives they do not neces- 

 sarily compel us fatally to the instinctive course of action. 

 A mother puts her child out to nurse ; a hungry man abstains 

 from eating his friend's dinner ; a lover abstains from caress- 

 ing his mistress in public. When two of our instincts are 

 opposed we do not, we cannot, fatally follow both ; one or the 

 other conquers. Precisely the same is true of the lower 

 animals. Their instinctive desires impel them just as 

 fatally, but not more fatally. The lion and the lamb, the 

 cat and the mouse, have lain down together in many a 

 "happy family." The dog may be taught to abstain from 

 the pursuit of the cat. Indeed, the house-dog is often the 

 loving friend of his hereditary enemy. When attacked the 

 cat " chooses " 2 between her rival impulses, the impulse to fly 

 and the impulse to defend herself. She always reacts to the 

 stronger. The spider hesitates before his gigantic mate. 

 Like automatic movements, therefore, instinctive actions are 

 poles apart from reflexes. 



428. We are compelled, then, I think, to place instinctive 

 actions in the voluntary category, or to place all actions in 

 the reflex category. To sum up : Instinctive actions resemble 

 rational actions in that they are always prompted by desire, 



1 James, Principles of Psychology, vol. ii, p. 384. 



2 Again I would impress on the reader that an action resulting from 

 choice is nothing other than a reaction to the stronger impulse. At the 

 present moment the idea of writing is hateful to me, and the idea of 

 reading a certain book delightful. I choose to continue writing only 

 because certain motives which impel me to the task are stronger than 

 those which impel me to idleness. All the moral education of our 

 children is nothing other than an attempt to supply them with impulses 

 (i. e. desires) that shall impel them to good rather than to evil. 



