THE KEGULATION OF NUMBEKS 



305 



above ; in disproof of such views no more need be said. More 

 often we meet with statements such as the following : ' The 

 population question pushes Germany on. For the most part it 

 is inland peoples that have most severely felt that pressure of 

 a growing population. Islanders and coast dwellers can expand 

 over the seas. But when inland peoples outgrow their bounds, 

 they must burst them.' x Such a statement is a striking example 

 of the over-estimation of the relief afforded by war and by 

 migration and of the under-estimation of the power of fecundity. 

 What has been said above regarding migration is again applicable 

 here. 



If our contention that over-population is not the cause of 

 migration is well founded, then the argument that war is also 

 due to over-population falls to the ground. Precisely the same 

 conditions which are supposed to push nations on to fight are also 

 supposed to push them on to migrate. As we shall see later, 

 this by no means implies that questions of population do not at 

 times enter into the situation when war breaks out. 



What then is the cause of war ? It is probable that the instinct 

 of pugnacity led to fighting when men lived in groups of families 

 at least between the males for the headship of the family. It is 

 further probable that, as social organization slowly evolved, 

 sporadic fighting of this kind was continued and led to fighting 

 between groups. But in very early times tradition began to 

 overlay and obscure the manifestations of instinct ; the manner 

 in which this occurs will form an important part of the discussion 

 in the second part of this book. It is enough to say here that 

 among primitive races tradition can be of such a nature as 

 altogether to overlay the instinct of pugnacity, as among certain, 

 peoples, who though not devoid of the instinct scarcely ever 

 fight because of the existence of powerful social conventions 

 and customs inhibiting its expression. Thus, though war may 

 form an outlet for pugnacity, it can no longer be said that it is 

 the direct consequence of pugnacity. War, in fact, gradually 

 becomes a custom. That this is now essentially the nature of 

 war needs no proof. It is obviously at the present day a mode 

 of action whereby the highly organized governments of modern 

 nations try to achieve some political end. 2 



1 Holland Rose, Origins of the War, p. 47. 



2 Evidence has lately been brought forward to show that not only is war a custom 



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