6 HABITS AND INSTINCTS OF ANIMALS. CHAP. I. 



inals forming the class Acrita, which grow as vege- 

 tables, and remain immovably attached to the spot 

 whereon they were born. The line of demarcation, in 

 fact, between beings with and without this faculty, is 

 as perfectly undeterminable as that between the two 

 great divisions of organised matter. 



(7.) VOLITION being, then, one' of the peculiar 

 prerogatives of animals, let us see in what manner this 

 faculty is developed. It is, in one sense, clearly dis- 

 tinct from life ; for, although both must exist in an 

 animal, it is LIFE, only, that is apparent in the vege- 

 table. And yet, on the other hand, as VOLITION neces- 

 sarily implies the possession of LIFE, it seems not 

 unreasonable to suppose that the one is the first rudi- 

 ment of the other. SENSATION is alike common to all 

 organised beings ; but CONSCIOUSNESS is, probably, re- 

 stricted to those, only, which possess volition. 



(8.) Now, it is clear, from what we have already 

 said, that volition is of two very different kinds 

 Instinct, and Reason. The first, indeed, may be con- 

 sidered the first germ, or rudimentary development, of 

 the latter ; since, without an accurate idea of the pro- 

 perties of reason, it would be almost impossible to 

 define where the one ceased, and the other began. 

 Hence, more than one writer has included both facul- 

 ties under the general denomination of MIND ; and as 

 mind, in this sense of the term, is equally possessed 

 both by man and brutes, they have been driven, as it 

 were, to that admission strange and offensive, as it has 

 been well termed which we have already noticed. 



(9.) An hypothesis such as this will not, how- 

 ever, be borne out by inductive philosophy. We shall 

 not repeat all that has been here said on the nature of 

 instinct ; but a few remarks may, perhaps, strengthen 

 our position, that MIND is totally distinct from this 

 lower faculty, both in its intention, its operation, and 

 its ultimate result. The intention of instinct is, simply, 

 to fulfil those functions of volition which each par- 

 ticular species is peculiarly organised to perform. The 



