CHAP. I. NATURE OF INSTINCT. 3 



do not act with a view to consequences, from their own 

 proper consciousness ; but that, whenever they do so 

 act, it is from a dictating energy, operating above the 

 sphere of their consciousness, and disposing them so to 

 do : that the business of mental analysis and extraction 

 is performed for them, as it were, in every instance 

 where they appear to exhibit proofs of it ; and that, 

 properly speaking, there is nothing of design attribut- 

 able to brutes in their actions, but merely a subordinate 

 voluntary principle and discriminating perception, which 

 may be termed natural, to distinguish it from what is 

 moral, intellectual, or scientific ; to which latter princi- 

 ples, alone, design can properly be referred." This theory, 

 at once, explains the apparent rationality observable 

 in many of the actions of animals ; and it will reconcile 

 its seeming indications with their general character and 

 manners. There is, however, " a strong tendency to 

 mistake the cause instrumental for the cause principal, 

 in this, as in other cases ; by which we are insensibly 

 led to assign the sum total of the attribute to the visible 

 agent, without stopping to consider further of the 

 matter. Thus, gratitude, which is a moral quality -in 

 man, is thought to be moral also in the dog; but, 

 surely, no one, upon mature consideration will imagine 

 that the dog reflects on the inclination or desire he 

 feels to act in a manner which we view as grateful, or 

 that he is pleased with the survey and reflection, that 

 the moral quality of his actions becomes objective to 

 him : and yet this is absolutely necessary, in order to 

 constitute a moral consciousness ; for, to effect this, it 

 is not only necessary that the action be outwardly, or in 

 effect, moral, but that this moral action be reflected 

 upon as such, in order that its moral quality may be 

 thus perceived and felt." * 



(3.) The same argument may be applied to every 

 circumstance which may seem to infer a mental or 

 moral consciousness, inconsistent with : the general na- 

 ture of brutes. By supposing that the " Divine Energy 



* French, in Zool. Journ. for March, 182-t, 

 B 2 



