MAN 257 



idea (i) of her Majesty herself ; (2) of Royal rank ; (3) of 

 a woman ; (4) of a human being; (5) of likeness; (6) of 

 chemical action; (7) of the sun's actinic power;* (8) of 

 the effect of light and shade; (9) of paper; (10) of an 

 inanimate object; (n) of substance; and, finally, (12) of 

 being or existence. 



Feelings, again, can never reflect on feelings, but 

 thoughts often reflect on thoughts. The vividness of a 

 feeling (deafening sound or blinding light) may destroy 

 the power of seme-perception but no vividness in an idea 

 will mar intellectual perception. It is impossible for ideas 

 to be too clear and distinct. Feelings become associated t 

 according to the order in which they have been before 

 felt, but ideas may become associated according to their 

 intellectual affinity. 



No efforts of our imagination, moreover, can ever 

 exceed sensuous experience. We can never imagine what 

 we have not felt in itself or in its elements ; but it is 

 quite otherwise with ideas. We have the idea " experi- 

 ence," but "experience" was never felt; and it is the 

 same as regards an act of seeing, hearing, or of any other 

 sense. The idea of " an act of seeing" is one thing, but 

 the act of exercising a sensitive power is quite another. 

 Nevertheless, though our thought can thus outrun our 

 sensible experience (the experience we gain through our 

 senses), it is impossible for us to entertain even the most 

 abstract thought, except by the help of some mental image 

 of things sensibly experienced an imagination which 

 serves as a support whereby we can mentally attain things 

 beyond experience. The mental images which generally 

 serve to aid us in our highest conceptions, are mental 

 images of words spoken or written. 



* See ante, p. in. t See ante p. 227. 



B 



