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ternal object an act simulated by the merely sensitive 

 activity of animals.* 



Conscious reflection and attention also accompany and 

 serve the next of our higher mental powers to which we 

 desire to direct our readers' attention namely, intellectual 

 memory. To this the merely sensitive memory of a 

 beast bears a certain analogy, which, however, is very 

 remote, since it lacks the most essential character of the 

 higher faculty, which is that it should be conscious. 

 Evidently we cannot be said to " remember " anything 

 unless we are conscious that the thing we so remember 

 has been present to our mind on some previous occasion. 

 An image might recur to our imagination a hundred 

 times ; but if at each recurrence it seemed to us some- 

 thing altogether new and unconnected with the past, we 

 could not be said to remember it. It would rather be 

 an example of extreme forgetfulness. 



There is yet a further distinction between sensuous 

 and intellectual memory. Every now and then we direct 

 our attention to try and recollect something which we 

 know we have for the moment forgotten, and which we 

 instantly recognise when we have managed to recall it to 

 our recollection. But besides this voluntary memory, we 

 are sometimes startled by the flashing into consciousness 

 of something we had forgotten, and which we were so far 

 from trying to recollect, that we were, when it so flashed 

 into consciousness, thinking of something entirely differ- 

 ent. Mental movements of this kind maybe distinguished, 

 as reminiscences, from those which follow a voluntary 

 search after things temporarily forgotten, which are 

 recollections. It is obvious, however, that neither of these 

 kinds of memory can exist without consciousness. Two 



* See ante, p. 228. 



