LOGIC 283 



tention " respectively is (i) the kind of animal we have 

 formed a concept of; (2) the lameness we judge about; or 

 (3) the dishonest action we infer to have taken place. 

 But these three thoughts have also the quality of being 

 thoughts of a special kind belonging to one or other 

 sets, or kinds, or groups, or forms of thought. Moreover, 

 each of them belongs to a different group or form 

 they are different " forms" of thought. Thus the first 

 (i) is a concept,* the second (2) is a judgment,* and the 

 last (3) is an inference a conclusion arrived at by a 

 process of reasoning. 



Thus each thought signifies, not only what is our 

 meaning, or first intention in using it, but also, 

 what " order " of thought it is. This latter signification 

 is said to be the second meaning or second " intention " 

 of each thought. Therefore logic is called the science of 

 second intentions. By this it is meant that logic treats 

 of the forms of thought, regardless of the matter to 

 which such thought may refer. Thus, e.g., in the thought 

 "that horse is lame," the form of the thought is a 

 "judgment." The matter of the thought is the fact of lame- 

 ness, with which fact logic has nothing whatever to do. 

 As therefore it has only to do with the forms which 

 thought may assume, it is justly called " the science of 

 the formal law of thought." 



But though logic has nothing to do with the material 

 truth of thoughts, it has to do, as before said, with so 

 conducting processess of thought as to secure that they 

 shall not themselves be the occasion of error, but, on the 

 contrary, aid in making explicit, truths which such 

 thoughts may implicitly contain. Logic, therefore, 

 as a guide to just and valid reasoning, is practical, and 



* See ante, p. 255. 



