370 ELEMENTS OF SCIENCE 



some states of " feeling," but what we perceive primarily, 

 directly, and immediately is neither the " feeling " nor 

 the " self-existence," but some concrete actual doing, 

 being, or suffering then and there experienced. 



Any one of us can, if he pleases, turn back his mind 

 upon itself, and either say to himself, " I have the 

 feelings which accompany reading this book," or "it is 

 I who have these feelings." But neither of these two 

 acts is a primary act of the mind. No one in beginning 

 to think, adverts either to his " present feelings " or to 

 his " continuous existence." No one begins by per- 

 ceiving his perception a bit more than he begins by 

 expressly adverting to the fact that it is he himself who 

 perceives it. But to become aware that one has any 

 definite feeling, is an act of reflection which is at least 

 as secondary and posterior as it is to become aware of 

 the " self " that has the feeling. Indeed a more labo- 

 rious effort is needed to recognise explicitly the implicit 

 " feeling," when we know we are doing anything, than 

 to bring before the mind explicitly * the implicit percep- 

 tion of our " persistent existence." Men continually 

 and promptly advert to the fact that actions and suffer- 

 ings are their own, but do not by any means so con- 

 tinually and promptly advert to the fact that the feelings 

 they experience are " existing feelings ." 



One of the greatest and most fundamental of all 

 errors, is the mistake of supposing we can know our 

 " states of feeling " more certainly and directly than we 

 can know the continuously existing self which has those 

 feelings. 



And how is the truth of this perception known to 

 us ? What is the test whereby we know it to be true ? 



* See ante, p, 255. 



