94 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 



concemeth the principles, and of that other part of 

 natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit ; 

 all these strangely commixed and confused ; but being 

 examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of 

 other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height 

 of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself. 

 Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction 

 which is current, that the same things are handled but 

 in several respects. As for example, that logic con- 

 sidereth of many things as they are in notion, and this 

 philosophy as they are in nature ; the one in appearance, 

 the other in existence ; but I find this difference better 

 made than pursued. For if they had considered quan- 

 tity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern 

 characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, 

 their inquiries must of force have been of a far other 

 kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling 

 quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how 

 far it multiplieth virtue ? Doth any give the reason, 

 why some things in nature are so common, and in so 

 great mass, and others so rare, and in so small quan- 

 tity ? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, 

 assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, 

 which is more like, but move to the load-stone, which 

 is less like ? Why in all diversities of things there 

 should be certain participles in nature, which are 

 almost ambiguous to which kind they should be re- 

 ferred ? But there is a mere and deep silence touching 

 the nature and operation of those common adjuncts 

 of things, as in nature : and only a resuming and 

 repeating of the force and use of them in speech or 

 argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this 

 nature I avoid all subtility, my meaning touching this 

 original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and 

 gross description by negative : ' That it be a receptacle 

 for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall 

 not within the compass of any of the special parts of 

 philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of 

 a higher stage.' 

 3. Now that there are many of that kind need not 



