THE SECOND BOOK 101 



itself. It is therefore now a question what is left 

 remaining for metaphysic ; wherein I may without 

 prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of an- 

 tiquity, that physic should contemplate that which is 

 inherent in matter, and therefore transitory ; and 

 metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. And 

 again, that physic should handle that which supposeth 

 in nature only a being and moving ; and metaphysic 

 should handle that which supposeth further in nature 

 a reason, understanding, and platform. But the 

 difference, perspicuously expressed, is most famiUar 

 and sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy 

 in general into the inquiry of causes, and productions 

 CI effects : so that part which concerneth the inquiry 

 of causes we do subdivide according to the received 

 and sound division of causes. The one part, which is 

 physic, inquireth and handleth the material and 

 efficient causes ; and the other, which is metaphysic, 

 handleth the formal and final causes. 



4. Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and 

 not according to our idiom for medicine) is situate in 

 a middle term or distance between natural history and 

 metaphysic. For natural history describeth the variety 

 of things ; physic the causes, but variable or respec- 

 tive causes ; and metaphysic the fixed and constant 

 causes. 



Limus ut hie durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit, 

 Uno eodemque igni. 



Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay ; 

 lire is the cause of coUiquation, but respective to wax. 

 But fire is no constant cause either of induration or 

 coUiquation : so then the physical causes are but the 

 efficient and the matter. Physic hath three parts, 

 whereof two respect nature united or collected, the 

 third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. 

 Nature is collected either into one entire total, or else 

 into the same principles or seeds. So as the first 

 doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of 

 things, as de mundo, de universitate rerum. The second 



