THE SECOND BOOK 103 



perplexed, as they are not to be inquired ; no more 

 than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in 

 gross the forms of those sounds which make words, 

 which by composition and transposition of letters are 

 infinite. But on the other side to inquire the form of 

 those sounds or voices which make simple letters is 

 easily comprehensible ; and being known induceth 

 and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist 

 and are compounded of them. In the same manner 

 to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold ; nay, 

 of water, of air, is a vain pursuit : but to inquire the 

 forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of 

 colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, 

 of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, 

 which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which 

 the essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures do 

 consist ; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is 

 that part of metaphysic which we now define of. Not 

 but that physic doth make inquiry and take considera- 

 tion of the same natures : but how ? Only as to the 

 material and efficient causes of them, and not as to 

 the forms. For example, if the cause of whiteness in 

 snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, 

 that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the 

 cause, it is well rendered ; but nevertheless is this 

 the form of whiteness ? No ; but it is the efficient, 

 which is ever but vehicvlum formae. This 

 part of metaphysic I do not find laboured Metaphysica 

 and performed : whereat I marvel not : eMnts^""'* 

 because I hold it not possible to be in- rerum. 

 vented by that course of invention which 

 hath been used ; in regard that men (which is the root 

 of all error) have made too untimely a departure and 

 too remote a recess from particulars. 



6. But the use of this part of metaphysic, which 

 I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent 

 in two respects : the one, because it is the duty and 

 virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of 

 individual experience, as much as the conception of 

 truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of 



