THE SECOND BOOK 129 



Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of 

 pretended natural magic have been so intemperate, 

 as they have exalted the power of the imagination to 

 be much one with the power of miracle-working faith. 

 Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their 

 view the secret passages of things, and specially of the 

 contagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive 

 it should likewise be agreeable to nature, that there 

 should be some transmissions and operations from 

 spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses ; 

 whence the conceits have grown (now almost made 

 civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of confidence 

 and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to 

 raise and fortify the imagination : for if the imagina- 

 tion fortified have power, then it is material to know 

 how to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in 

 crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part 

 of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that 

 ceremonies, characters, and charms do work, not by 

 any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but 

 serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that 

 useth it ; as images are said by the Roman church to 

 fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them that 

 pray before them. But for mine own judgement, if it 

 be admitted that imagination hath power, and that 

 ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used 

 sincerely and intentionally for that purpose ; yet I 

 should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first 

 edict which God gave unto man, ' In sudore vultus 

 comedes panem tuum.' For they propound those 

 noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to 

 be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by 

 a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiencies in 

 these knowledges I will report none, other than the 

 general deficience, that it is not known how much of 

 them is verity, and how much vanity. 



XII. 1. The knowledge which respecteth the facul- 

 ties of the mind of man is of two kinds ; the one respect- 

 ing his understanding and reason, and the other his 

 will, appetite, and affection ; whereof the former pro- 

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