THE SECOND BOOK 137 



invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an 

 application ; which is the cause why the schools do 

 place it after judgement, as subsequent and not prece- 

 dent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase 

 as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at 

 large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let 

 it be called invention : so as it be perceived and dis- 

 cerned, that the scope and end of this invention is 

 readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not 

 addition or amplification thereof. 



7. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are 

 two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former 

 of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, con- 

 sisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. 

 And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfuUy, doth deride 

 the Sophists near his time, saying, ' They did as if one 

 that professed the art of shoe -making should not teach 

 how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness 

 a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.' But yet 

 a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have 

 no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, 

 he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, 

 speaking of divine knowledge, saith, ' That the king- 

 dom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth 

 forth both new and old store ' : and we see the ancient 

 writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that pleaders 

 should have the places, whereof they have most con- 

 tinual use, ready handled in all the variety that may 

 be ; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of 

 the law against equity, and contrary ; and to speak for 

 presumptions and inferences against testimony, and 

 contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken imto it by 

 great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever 

 a man shall have occasion to speak of (if he will take the 

 pains), he may have it in effect premeditate and 

 handled in thesi. So that when he cometh to a particu- 

 lar he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and 

 times, and places, and such other circumstances of 

 individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of 

 Demosthenes ; who, in regard of the great force that 



