140 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 



of propositions to principles in a middle term. Tlie 

 principles to be agreed by all and exempted from argu- 

 ment ; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of 

 every man's invention ; the reduction to be of two kinds, 

 direct and inverted ; the one when the proposition is 

 reduced to the principle, which they term a probation 

 ostensive ; the other, when the contradictory of the 

 proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the prin- 

 ciple, which is that which they call per incommodum, or 

 pressing an absurdity ; the number of middle terms to 

 be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less 

 removed from the principle. 



4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, 

 the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution ; 

 the former frameth and setteth down a true form of 

 consequence, by the variations and deflections from 

 which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. 

 Toward the composition and structure of which form, 

 it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are 

 propositions, and the parts of propositions, which 

 are simple words. And this is that part of logic which 

 is comprehended in the Analjiiics. 



5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for 

 expedite use and assurance sake ; discovering the more 

 subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their 

 redargutions, which is that which is termed denches. 

 For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it hap- 

 peneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in 

 juggUng feats, which, though we know not how they are 

 done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be ; yet 

 the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man 

 besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his 

 judgement. 



6. This part concerning denches is excellently handled 

 by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato 

 in example ; not only in the persons of the Sophists, 

 but even in Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm 

 nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by 

 another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objec- 

 tion, fallace, and redargution. And although we have 



