156 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 



the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression 

 in this art ; and therefore the deficiencies which I shall 

 note will rather be in some collections, which may as 

 handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of 

 the art itself. 



2. Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about 

 the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest ; 

 the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagi- 

 nation for the better moving of the will. For we see 

 reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by 

 three means ; by illaqueation or sophism, which per- 

 tains to logic ; by imagination or impression, which 

 pertains to rhetoric ; and by passion or affection, which 

 pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, 

 men are wrought by Cunning, by importunity, and by 

 vehemency ; so in this negotiation within ourselves, 

 men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited and 

 importuned by impressions or observations, and trans- 

 ported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so 

 unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should 

 have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and 

 advance it. For the end of logic is to teach a form of 

 argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it. The 

 end of morality is to procure the affections to obey 

 reason, and not to invade it. The end of rhetoric is to 

 fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress 

 it : for these abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo, for 

 caution. 



3. And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, 

 though springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians 

 of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, 

 resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, 

 and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the plea- 

 sure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more 

 conversant in adorning that which is good, than in 

 colouring that which is evil ; for there is no man but 

 speaketh more honestly than he can do or think : and 

 it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that 

 because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of 

 estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against elo- 



