May 5, 1892] 



NATURE 



When we leave the physiological and enter the psychical 

 field, appeal is constantly made to the "principle of 

 apperception " or " selective synthesis." But does not 

 the author go somewhat beyond what is justified by our 

 very imperfect knowledge of the facts of cerebral physio- 

 logy when he asserts that " after we enter consciousness, 

 we find a principle of apperception to which there is no 

 analogy in physiological integration"? Elsewhere he 

 says : " Now, as a fact, the great principle of mental 

 organization, selective synthesis, finds no apparent 

 counterpart in physics." In direct opposition to this 

 view, we venture to contend that nothing is more re- 

 markable than the parallelism (if it be no more) of selec- 

 tive synthesis in the physical and the psychical spheres. 

 In the physical world this is best seen in the formation of 

 chemical compounds and their segregation in crystalline 

 form. In the psychical world it is seen in the so-called prin- 

 ciple of apperception. This is, however, only the expression 

 in the conceptual sphere of a principle which, stripped of 

 all metaphysical implications, must be extended to the 

 whole range of psychical life, as a general law of psycho- 

 genesis. In the organic world (at any rate the animal 

 world) the two principles (if two they be) meet. And if, 

 notwithstanding the splendid work done in bionomics, 

 through the application of "natural selection" to the 

 elucidation of the problem, we have not yet reached a 

 scientific expression of selective synthesis in organic life 

 and growth, this is no proof that there is no such selective 

 synthesis. 



In accordance with the general principles he adopts, 

 Prof. Baldwin divides feeling into the two great classes 

 of (i) sensuous feeling, and (2) ideal feeling. Sensuous 

 feeling relates to the bodily functions. " Sensuous 

 pleasure," says the author, "' may be defined as the con- 

 scious effect of that which makes for the continuance of 

 the bodily life or its advancement ; and sensuous pain, 

 the conscious effect of that which makes for the decline 

 of the bodily life or its limitation." Ideal feelings, on 

 the other hand, are the modifications of sensibility which 

 accompany the exercise of the apperceptive function. 

 Ideal pleasure may be defined as " the conscious effect of 

 that which makes for the continuance of the apperceptive 

 life or its advancement ; and ideal pain, the conscious 

 effect of that which makes for the decline of the apper- 

 ceptive life or its limitation." But though sensuous feel- 

 ing can have no reference to the conceptual or apper- 

 ceptive life, ideal feeling has reference (however much we 

 affect to despise or ignore the mere body) to physical as 

 well as intellectual well-being. Hence Prof. Baldwin 

 concludes " that ideal tone (pleasure or pain) refers to 

 personal well-being as a whole." 



We must pass over without comment an important 

 and interesting discussion of "reality and belief," which 

 is worthy of careful consideration, and may proceed to 

 note the somewhat unusual sense in which the author 

 uses the word " ideals." 



" Ideals," he says, " are not mental constructions at 

 all : if once constructed they would no longer be ideals : 

 which only means that what we call ideals are emotional 

 in their nature, expressing the drift or felt outcome of the 

 constructive process, not any actual attainment of it. If 

 my ideal man, for example, were an intellectual construc- 

 tion, I would be able to describe him. . . . Ideals, there- 



NO. 1175, VOL. 46] 



fore, are the forms which we feel our conceptions would 

 take if we were able to realize in them a satisfying degree 

 of unity, harmony, significance, and universality." 



This seems to us somewhat strained. It is a descrip- 

 tion of theoretically ideal ideals which have been emptied 

 of all practical value. There are assuredly practical 

 ideals which, though unattainable, can be definitely real- 

 ized as intellectual constructions permeated with emo- 

 tional tone. And it is these practical ideals which are 

 influential on conduct. 



The distinction between subjective and objective ends 

 in ethics is carefully drawn. Subjective ends are the 

 felt and more or less definitely realized motives of the 

 voluntary process. They alone have psychological value 

 as the immediate determinants of conduct. Objective 

 ends are a matter of cognition. 



" Even though it were granted that all voluntary action 

 arose and survived by exclusive reference to pleasure or 

 to self-realization, yet it would be a patent fallacy to say 

 that the only voluntary end is either of them— that con- 

 sciousness has all along been versed in our biology or our 

 speculative ethics, and has aimed to fulfil the one or the 

 other. Consciousness has no inkling of the hivaiui of 

 Aristotle, or the connatus of Spinoza, or the Trieb of 

 Wundt and Schneider ; of the ' strife [wV] for existence ' 

 of Spencer, the theoretic 'reverence for law' of Kant, 

 the 'self-realization' of Green, or the dialectical 'be- 

 coming' of Hegel. Let us discover these things if we 

 may, but do not let us say that a man is not moral unless 

 he has a realizing sense of them." 



We have left ourselves no space to deal with Prof. 

 Baldwin's discussion of the phenomena of the will. We 

 do not by any means agree with all that he says thereon, 

 but it is worthy of careful consideration. 



Prof. James's "Text-book of Psychology" is a re- 

 arranged abridgment of his larger " Principles," with the 

 addition of some description of the senses and sense- 

 organs. We have so recently (Nature, vol. xliii. p. 506) 

 expressed our opinion of the value of the larger work, 

 that we can, without injustice to Prof. James, afford to be 

 brief in our notice of this abridgment, merely selecting 

 the chapter on " Instinct " on which to offer a few 

 comments. 



Every organism comes into the world with an innate 

 capacity to perform, more or less definitely, certain 

 activities under the appropriate environing circumstances. 

 Of these activities, a certain number which are (i) com- 

 plex in character, and (2) performed {a) in a definite way, 

 \b) without foresight of the end to be attained, {c) with no 

 previous education in the performance, and {d) uniformly 

 by all normal individuals of the species concerned, are 

 now by pretty common consent described as instinctive. 

 Clearly such instinctive actions are the outcome of the 

 innate capacity of the animal which performs them ; but 

 they are a peculiar and special manifestation of this innate 

 capacity : they have definite and clearly assignable 

 characteristics. Now no one can question that man 

 comes into the world with a relatively enormous store of 

 innate capacity, and that he has innate tendencies to 

 perform half a hundred particular activities. And yet he 

 has but few instincts. He leads a life of hesitation and 

 choice, an intelligent life. To say with Prof. James that 

 this is " not because he has no instincts —rather because 



