September i, 1892] 



NATURE 



417 



different Records, as one is requested to at present. The sale 

 of such a work would be greater than that of the present incom- 

 plete and tardy publications. Besides, the promoters would 

 doubtless be prepared to sell the various sections separately — 

 an urgent reform that has long been clamoured for in vain ; this 

 alone would materially increase the receipts. 



Having thought much of this subject during the last five years, 

 and having talked it over with many Recorders and biblio- 

 graphers, I venture to take this opportunity of putting forward 

 the crude outlines of an undeveloped scheme. There is no wish 

 to offend those unselfish toilers who have done and are doing so 

 much for us, or the corporate bodies that support them. But 

 this is a question that must be approached from a cosmopolitan 

 standpoint. Men of science all the world over should support it 

 with purse and person. All petty considerations of nationality, 

 even of language, should be sunk. The aim of the work should 

 be the advancement of science ; only if it is truly International, 

 can it possibly be realized out of Utopia. F. A. Bather. 



British Museum (Nat. Hist.), August 19. 



Perhaps you will kindly allow me, as the author of a certain 

 pamphlet on "The Organization of Science," to say a few words 

 on Mr. Minchin's letter (Nature, August 18), which naturally 

 had an especial interest for me. I am sorrowfully pleased to find the 

 principles advocated in my pamphlet illustrated so well by con- 

 crete instance, and, needless to say, I heartily wish Mr. Minchin 

 success in his endeavour to introduce order into at least one 

 province of the scientific class, seeing that the text of my pam- 

 phlet may be exactly summed up in his remark — " A great need 



. . . is the intelligent (?rfa«/2«^/^« of scientific research." 



One point in Mr. Minchin's letter was of especial interest to 

 me, for he invites the Royal Society to take in hand this work 

 of organization, instead of leaving private individuals to execute 

 at a great sacrifice the work which this wealthy corporation 

 systematically neglects. Now a reference to my pamphlet (pp. 

 1 1-14) will show that this was a main thesis sustained there. 

 Whether Mr. Minchin has done me the honour to read my 

 pamphlet and is already preaching my crusade for me, or whether 

 the similarity between our views is a simple coincidence of 

 opinion, I know not, but whichever be the case, it is peculiarly 

 gratifying to me to receive practically an endorsement from one 

 whose experience renders him so especially qualified to speak 

 with authority. A Free Lance. 



London, August 23, 



"The Limits of Animal Intelligence." 

 Mr. Dixon has not, I think, quite grasped the main ten- 

 dency of my paper read before the International Congress of 

 Experimental Psyghology. Nor is this to be wondered at. He 

 quotes from a brief summary of what was itself but an abstract 

 of a portion of a work on Comparative Psychology on which I 

 am engaged. I am in agreement with nearly all that Mr. Dixon 

 says, except where he misunderstands my position, and except 

 in the opinion he expresses in the last sentence. When Mr. 

 Dixon says, " Of course it is true that my knowledge of my 

 c'tvn psychology does differ in kind from my knowledge of that 

 of animals, but it differs in exactly the same way from that of all 

 other men," he is expressing the views which I, in common with 

 most men who have seriously studied the question, hold. And 

 when he says, " If in no case is ' an animal activity to be inter- 

 preted as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical 

 faculty if it can be fairly interpreted as the outcome of one which 

 stands lower in the psychological scale,' the same rule should be 

 applied to the (scientific) interpretation of human activities," I 

 can only say that I heartily agree with him. Since, therefore, 

 we have so much in common, I do not propose to occupy valu- 

 able space in discussing the outstanding points of difference 

 between us. I may perhaps be allowed, however, to take ad- 

 vantage of the courtesy of the Editor of Nature, and to say a 

 few words in elucidation of the thesis I very imperfectly set 

 forth in my paper, a thesis based entirely on observation and 

 induction. 



In the first place the study of my own mental processes, and 

 of the nature and sequence of my own states of consciousness, has 

 led me to the conclusion that there is a great difference between 

 the mere feeling or awareness of certain relationships and the 

 clear cognizing of these or other relationships. When I am 

 bicycling, or playing tennis, or when I am living the practical 

 life of naive perception, I am aware of, and shape my actions in 



NO. I 192, VOL. 46] 



accordance with, a feeling of the relations which the objects of 

 the external world bear to me and to each other. The greater 

 part of my practical skill in action and of such intelligence as I 

 show in meeting the emeigencies that occur in my active life, are 

 the outcome of this awareness of relations. But when I begin 

 to attempt to explain phenomena, and to formulate my know- 

 ledge of the world, I find I am forced to pay special attention to 

 these relationships as such, and to clearly and precisely cognize 

 them. This conclusion, I repeat, is the outcome of observation, 

 and is not, so far as I am aware, the result of any a priori 

 considerations. 



Looking back upon my own past, and collating the results 

 with those reached by other observers, I find that the mere feel- 

 ing or awareness of relations is prior in development to the clear 

 and precise cognition of them. The awareness of relations seems 

 to be, in fact, the undifferentiated germ from which their clear 

 cognition has been developed ; it is not knowledge, properly so 

 called, but it is the raw material from which knowledge and the 

 products of the intellect are shaped. Hence I conclude that the 

 order of development or evolution in man is — first, the practical 

 awareness of relations among phenomena, and then subsequently 

 the cognition and clear knowledge (in the full sense of the word) 

 of these relations as such. 



Now, passing to the psychology of animals, such as the higher 

 mammalia, the hypothesis suggests itself that they are still in the 

 stage of mere awareness, and have not reached the stage of clear 

 cognition, which, as I showed in my paper, involves reflection 

 and introspection. This is put forward as an hypothesis ; one 

 based on observation and the doctrine of evolution ; and one to 

 be treated in the same spirit and on the same methods as other 

 scientific hypotheses. It must be submitted to the touchstone of 

 verification. The question is : — Are the activities of animals 

 explicable on the supposition that the agents are merely aware of 

 the relations ; or must we suppose that they fully cognize them ? 

 I feel sure that my own practical activities are in the main based 

 on awareness, and this leads me to suspect that the practical 

 activities of animals are also of like psychological implication. 

 The matter must, however, so far as is possible, be put to the 

 test of experiment and observation. I Rave conducted from time 

 to time experiments with the object of ascertaining how far 

 there is evidence in the dog of true cognition — of causation for 

 example. I am inclined to believe as the result of my observa- 

 tions that there is nothing beyond a simple awareness of the 

 causal nexus. But I am far from wishing to dogmatize in the 

 matter. I am chiefly concerned that the phenomena should be 

 carefully observed, and that experiments should be conducted on 

 definite scientific lines. 



In conclusion I must be allowed to say that the phrases 

 "difference in kind" and "difference of degree" savour some- 

 what of mere academic discussion, and may perhaps be left for 

 those who deal with the matter on a priori lines and not from 

 the standpoint of evolution. I for one do not for a moment 

 question that the mental processes of man and of animals are 

 alike products of evolution. The power of cognizing relations, 

 reflection and introspection, appear to me to mark a new de- 

 parture in evolution. But whether, as I am at present disposed 

 to hold, the departure took place through the aid of language 

 coincident with, or subsequent to, the human phase of evolu- 

 tion ; or whether, as other observers and thinkers believe, it 

 took place, or is now taking place, in the lower mammalia or 

 in other animals, is a matter for calm, temperate, and impartial 

 discussion founded on accurate, and, as far as possible, crucial 

 experiment and observation. C. Lloyd Morgan, 



Rules of Nomenclature. 



In your review of Mr. Massee's monograph of the Myxogastres 

 (Nature, p. 365) I notice the sentence, " Under the generally 

 accepted lules of nomenclature, this leads to Massee standing 

 as the authority for many species, transferred by him, in reality, 

 to another genus." I take this to mean that, for example, a 

 species of which the trivial name is, say, abii, and which was 

 originally described by an author Xyz, and referred (erroneously) 

 by him to the genus Cdia, has been transferred now to another 

 (the correct, according to present knowledge) genus Efia, and 

 the name is now printed in this work not as Ejia abii, Xyz, but 

 as Efia abii, Massee. I am aware that this course is frequently 

 adopted, but surely not "under the generally accepted rules of 

 nomenclature." There is no copy of the British Association 

 " Rules" within reach here, but my recollection is that they 



