DARWINISM AND POLITICS. 



in the struggle for existence, but know that they 

 are so engaged, are capable of looking round 

 on what they are doing, of reflecting, of com- 

 paring results and considering some good, some 

 bad, some to be desired and others to be 

 avoided. If we distinguish as Professor 



I T 



H ux ley says it _is__ convenient to do bet\ye en 

 man and nature, the n it is of extreme im port- 

 ance to us to disc over the natural laws w hich 

 o peraTe"in society, b ut it does not follow that 

 we owe them any allegian ce. They are " laws " 

 simply in the sense of being generalisations 

 from experience of facts or hypotheses by 

 whi ch we find i t possible to make the facts more 

 intelligible to ourselves : and it is the merest 

 ambiguity ot language that leads to the argu- 

 ment that what can be called " an economic 

 law" has any claim upon our reverence. It may 

 tell us something convenient or something; in- 

 convenient ; but of itself it is, like nature, 

 absolutely non-moral. 



On the other hand, if we use Nature (with 

 a very big N) to include all that goes on in 

 human society, human institutions and human 



iideaiT must be included in this conception of 

 -Nature : else the scientihc sociologist is assum- 



