204< DISCOURSE ON THE STUDY 



(216.) In estimating, however, the value of a 

 theory, we are not to look, in the first instance, 

 to the question, whether it establishes satisfacto- 

 rily, or not, a particular process or mechanism ; for 

 of this, after all, we can never obtain more than 

 that indirect evidence which consists in its leading 

 to the same results. What, in the actual state of 

 science, is far more important for us to know, is 

 whether our theory truly represent all the facts, and 

 include all the laws, to which observation and induc- 

 tion lead. A theory which did this would, no doubt, 

 go a great way to establish any hypothesis of me- 

 chanism or structure, which might form an essen- 

 tial part of it : but this is Tery far from being 

 the case, except in a few limited instances ; and, 

 till it is so, to lay any great stress on hypotheses 

 of the kind, except in as much as they serve 

 as a scaffold for the erection of general laws, is 

 to " quite mistake the scaffold for the pile." Re- 

 garded in this light, hypotheses have often an emi- 

 nent use : and a facility in framing them, if attended 

 with an equal facility in laying them aside when 

 they have served their turn, is one of the most 

 valuable qualities a philosopher can possess ; while, 

 on the other hand, a bigoted adherence to them, 

 or indeed to peculiar views of any kind, in opposi- 

 tion to the tenor of facts as they arise, is the bane 

 of all philosophy. 



(217.) There is no doubt, however, that the 

 safest course, when it can be followed, is to rise by 

 inductions carried on among laws, as among facts, 

 from law to law, perceiving, as we go on', how laws 

 which we have looked upon as unconnected be- 



