CHAPTER II 



THE COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 

 I. THE CERTAINTY OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE 



A very pointed discussion has recently been carried on, con- 

 cerning the proper standpoint to be assumed in the criticism of 

 the philosophers and philosophical schools of the past. How far 

 ought we to forget the increased knowledge which the years have 

 brought us, and, entering into the life of the past, to judge of 

 the value of its theories only in their own terms? Such conduct 

 seems a commendable generosity to old friends. But are the 

 philosophers more our friends than truth; and can the claims 

 of truth be satisfied if the standards by which we judge be any- 

 thing less than established fact and cogent demonstration? The 

 question has had a two-fold bearing, according as the reputation 

 of the thinker or the continued consideration to be given to his 

 work has been regarded as at stake. On the first score, the his- 

 torically minded critics have a comparatively easy case to defend. 

 Few men of sense are now inclined, for example, to begrudge 

 Descartes his fame as a natural philosopher, because his vortex- 

 theory of creation or his hypothesis of animal spirits flowing 

 through hollow nerve-channels has been definitely abandoned. 

 The greatness of the scientist does not depend wholly on his 

 permanent achievements. But, on the second score, the justice 

 of the historical attitude is not so clear; and many a learned critic 

 must have felt the accusation rankling within him, that he had 

 debased the study of philosophy to a mere aesthetic appreciation 

 of harmonious and grand ideas. 



There are several reasons, nevertheless, which constrain us to 

 the opinion, that with doctrines, as with men, the sympathetic 

 criticism is the best. In the first place, the observation is famil- 

 iar, that the endeavor to do bare justice is a constant source of 



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