COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 29 



determinate character of the relationship is not perceived in the 

 cognition of the relationship itself, but is an induction from ex- 

 perience, not less doubtful than many others. But, in Hume's 

 own language, these four kinds of relation, "depending solely 

 upon ideas [i. e., upon the ideas related] can be the objects of 

 knowledge and certainty," and accordingly "are the foundation 

 of science" in a sense to which no induction from experience can 

 pretend. 1 We submit that this means, and can only mean, that 

 in the act of comparison from which the idea of the relation is 

 derived, there is involved an intuition of the deterrhinateness of 

 the relation. 



This, however, is a digression. What we wish particularly 

 to make clear is, not that Berkeley or Hume retained elements of 

 intuitionalism in their systems, but the far more important fact, 

 that intuitionalism and empiricism have a common principle in 

 their acceptance of a direct and infallible perception of truth. 

 That in comparison with this fundamental dogma the differences 

 between the two great schools sink into comparative insignifi- 

 cance, will, we trust, become increasingly apparent through the 

 discussions of the following chapters. 



^Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section i. 



