COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 31 



rate, we find that in Descartes's methodology simplicity is not 

 so much used as a mark for the distinguishing of intuitions 

 perhaps that would have made the intuitionalistic theory too 

 palpably a stop-gap as the clearness and distinctness of intui- 

 tional cognition are regarded as ensuring the simplicity of its 

 content. For, in the first place, "whatever is more simple is 

 whatever is more easy to comprehend, and what we might make 

 use of in the solution of problems;" and, in the second place, 

 "it is to be observed . . . that there are a few necessary elements 

 that we perceive by themselves, independently of all others, I 

 do not say at first, but by the aid of experience and the light 

 that is in us. Also I say that it is necessary to observe these 

 with care; for it is these which we call the most simple of each 

 series." 1 And again: "Considering here things merely in their 

 relation to our intelligence, we shall call simple those only the 

 notion of which is so clear and so distinct that the mind cannot 

 divide it into other notions still more simple." 2 



Simplicity, relative or absolute, thus means for rationalism 

 logical priority. Now let it be recalled that according to this view 

 the order of logical priority is irreversible ; that in the system of 

 science every inferred truth owes its whole certainty to its prem- 

 ises without contributing anything to theirs ; and that accordingly 

 the knowledge of a conclusion is impossible except upon the 

 basis of its own proper premises. This now means that the knowl- 

 edge of the complex somehow contains the knowledge of its con- 

 stitutent simple elements even though these latter may never 

 have attracted attention. "Thus I can know a triangle without 

 ever having noticed that this knowledge contains that of the 

 angle, the line, the number three, figure, extension, etc.; which 

 does not prevent our saying that the nature of the triangle is a 

 compound of all these natures and that they are better known than 

 the triangle, since they are what are comprised in it." 3 We know 



l Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VI. Torrey, Philosophy of Descartes, pp. 

 74. 76. 



2 Ibid., XII; Torrey, p. 98; italics ours. 



3 Ibid , XII; Torrey, p. 101; italics ours. So Spinoza holds that, if we have 



