COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 37 



But with all its plausibility the doctrine of externality is ex- 

 ceedingly close to another which is shocking to common sense, 

 and into which the former shows a constant tendency to trans- 

 form itself; the theory, namely, that relations are unreal. The 

 reason for this tendency is apparent. All relations whatsoever 

 would seem to be external to the simple elements of which all 

 reality consists. It may be suggested and in recent times the 

 suggestion has seriously been made that some relations, at least, 

 are themselves simple elements of reality, as underivable and as 

 unquestionable as the terms between which they subsist. But a 

 simple relation, existing independently of any and all terms, ap- 

 peared to the old dogmatists to be a mere absurdity ; so that this 

 mode of escape was not open to them. To what new difficulties 

 it might have led, the example of Kant will perhaps teach us. 

 For the present it will suffice for us to note that neither ration- 

 alism nor empiricism is able, when pressed, to vindicate the 

 reality of relations nor greatly cares to do so. 



In the general degradation of relations to the merely phenom- 

 enal, there is one, at least, which for rationalism remains sacred 

 and unassailable; namely, the logical relation of intensive inclu- 

 sion. 1 While, therefore, each concept signifies only the essence 

 of its object as unaffected by all relations to other objects 

 while, to take a famous example, the concept wax signifies what 

 wax is universally, regardless of its behavior toward other things 

 in the world, and the concept fire contains no reference to the 

 influence of fire upon wax or wood or gunpowder still, where one 

 concept includes another, a real relation subsists between them. 

 Thus both fire and wax include in their connotation the less 

 intensive concept, mode of extension. 



The ground for the exception is not far to seek. This relation 

 is the one among all others which may reasonably be said not 

 to be external, at least to the more intensive concept. For the 

 relation expresses the real essence of the concept, which is the 



: In which the definition of the one term includes the other; as with insect 



and anima 1 . 



