40 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



cartes does say 1 that while, as ideas, both positive and negative 

 are equally elementary, nevertheless the one denotes a reality of 

 which the other denotes the privation. Then, if this be supposed 

 to be the ground of the negative judgment, we have the paradox 

 of two concepts, in themselves utterly indifferent to each other, 

 held asunder in thought by a characteristic of reality which is 

 known only through the concepts themselves. 



From the point of view which these reflections indicate, and 

 which, while it belonged to neither Leibniz nor Spinoza, probably 

 represents the real drift of opinion of both, leaving aside the 

 question whether any simple negative concepts actually exist, 2 

 it is clear that no simple positive concept can be universally 

 affirmed or denied of any other. On the other hand, there is 

 nothing to prevent any two simple positive concepts, or, indeed, 

 all such concepts, from being predicates of one all-comprehensive 

 concept whose connotation includes them all. This concept, be- 

 cause it can be included in no more intensive one, can never be a 

 predicate. Now this was the ancient meaning of the term sub- 

 stance (that which in judgment must always be subject and never 

 predicate); and it is connected with the modern meaning (the 

 eternally existent) by the simple reflection, that since no simple 

 predicate can be denied of it, it contains all possible reality. 

 As predicates of substance, the simple positive ideas are called 

 attributes. Now because any substance must contain every pos- 

 sible attribute, Spinoza concludes that there can be but one sub- 

 stance ("All determination is negation"); while Leibniz, reflect- 

 ing that an identical quality can exist in any number of degrees, 

 finds room for an infinite number of substances possessing the 

 same attributes in different degrees, one alone (God) possessing 

 them absolutely, or in an infinite degree. 



Thus, as the system works itself out, rationalism conceives the 



iRulesfor the Direction of the Mind, XII. Torrey, Philosophy of Descartes, p. 99. 



2 The solution of this question clearly depends upon the further inquiry, whether 

 contradictory concepts imply a genus of which they are alike members. This is, 

 by the way, a formal aspect of Hegel's famous discussion of being and naught; 

 which are conceived, as he says, as simple contradictories, and yet have no higher 

 genus within which they may be distinguished. 



