4 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



periment were all-important. The great rationalists of the seven- 

 teegth century Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, for 

 example however great their differences in detail, were agreed 

 upon the general point, that deduction is the sole ultimately 

 satisfactory mode of proof ; that experimental methods are wholly 

 subordinate devices, which may, indeed, be indispensable in the 

 course of a complex investigation, but which the completed theory 

 must in every case cast aside. Bacon had taught that science 

 must begin with particulars, rising by successive inductions to 

 more and more general laws, and arriving at its supreme ex- 

 planatory principles only at the last stage of its endeavors. Ac- 

 cording to the rationalists, that whole ascent is a mere preliminary 

 to the task of science ; science itself begins with secure first prin- 

 ciples, and its problem is the explanation of the more particular 

 laws of nature as necessary consequences of the first principles. 

 Finally, whereas the rationalists one and all regarded precise 

 definition and the consistent use of terms as prime necessities for 

 scientific discussion, and counted upon these as most potent aids 

 to the discovery of truth, the great chancellor held that the estab- 

 lishment of definitions belongs not to the beginnings of science 

 but to its consummation, and that in the meantime the effort at 

 verbal consistency is only too apt to issue in self-deception. 



It would be beyond our present purpose to attempt a complete 

 explanation of this phenomenon the temporary unsuccess JD| 

 Bacon's polemic. It has been customary to attribute it in great 

 measure to personal defects in him ; especially to a lack of plod- 

 ding thoroughness, that made his brilliant suggestions mere sug- 

 gestions, and left his programs of scientific advancement un- 

 supported by actual solid contributions to knowledge. Two 

 other causes_were probably more important. The first of these 

 was the silent influence of Aristotle. It is true that in the seven- 

 teenth century it was not the fashion to refer to Aristotle except 

 for the purpose of emphasizing one's disagreement with him and 

 one's contempt for his authority. But "he who flees is not yet 

 free" ; and never did the perennial vigor of the ancient rationalism 



