42 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



subject, the genus must next be resolved into a higher genus and 

 a new difference, and this genus again into a still higher genus 

 ,and yet another difference; and so on, until a highest genus is 

 reached which is incapable of further analysis and thus marks 

 the limit of the process. But it has frequently been forgotten 

 that in each definition any single element of the subject may be 

 chosen as difference, the whole remainder then standing as genus; 

 or, in other words, that in the process of successive definition by 

 which a complex concept is explained, no one order in which the 

 elements shall be added in is predetermined. Every simple con- 

 cept is thus a summum genus. But when a certain order of 

 definition has for any reason become regarded as necessary, the 

 successive genera are naturally viewed as presupposing each other 

 in the given order; the equal significance of the differences is 

 forgotten; and the summum genus is regarded as the source and 

 cause of the whole series. To put the matter differently, the 

 summum genus is regarded as being a simple concept in another 

 sense than the various differences. It is capable of being thought 

 by itself, while they are incapable of being thought except as its 

 limitations or determinations. They are aspects of concepts, but 

 not themselves concepts. The summum genus alone expresses 

 the essence of self-subsistent reality; it alone is true Being, the 

 being both of itself and of all things else ; and hence all its species 

 must be regarded as particular manifestations to which it deter- 

 mines itself for there is no other Being to determine it. 



Let this brief account of the mystic logic be taken parentheti- 

 cally. It lies outside the proper field of our inquiry, and is in- 

 serted only to prevent misunderstanding. For a clear and striking 

 contrast of the two mental attitudes, compare the following quo- 

 tations, from Descartes and Spinoza respectively. "We say, in 

 the third place, that these simple elements are all known by 

 themselves." 1 "By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and 

 is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a con- 

 ception can be formed independently of any other conception." 2 



1 Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII; Torrey, op. cit , p 99. 

 ^Ethics, Book I, Def. Ill; Elwes tr. 



