52 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



of rational knowledge from the essentially irrational and un- 

 related elements of sensation has often been pointed out. But, 

 as we have seen, this was precisely the problem which confronted 

 the rationalist; for his logical ultimate was a bare given, as irra- 

 tional and unrelated as the simple sensation. Empiricism and 

 rationalism alike conceive the process of analysis as leading to a 

 final goal and yielding an irreducible element. That the one 

 conceives this ultimate as a conceptual absolute, and the other 

 as a psychological absolute, is of minor importance. A highest 

 concept and a simple sensation, regarded as the ultimate elements 

 of rational experience, and united to others of their kind by no 

 other relation than that of mere coexistence, are indistinguishable 

 and alike meaningless. 



Along with this conception of the real as constituted by ulti- 

 mate elements, goes the complementary conception of relations 

 as merely external bonds. The process of analysis, whether logi- 

 cal or psychological, consists essentially in stripping away these 

 relations until the inner core is revealed. The issuance of the 

 process in elements whose validity can be attested only by their 

 mere immediacy is the common criterion of its success. And just 

 as the analysis which leads to the elements is a mere denial and 

 casting aside, so the process of synthesis can be nothing more 

 than a bare affirmation, a joining together of the essentially un- 

 related. The organization of rational thought for both rational- 

 ism and empiricism is an externally imposed arrangement. 



With an important reservation, to which attention will imme- 

 diately be called, rationalism and empiricism may be said to agree 

 further in the parallel treatment of logical and causal connection. 

 Rationalism, with its carefully formulated correspondence be- 

 tween the ontological and logical orders, establishes the peculiar 

 relationship by the reduction of both modes of connection to 

 terms of intensive inclusion. Just as the essence of a thing 

 contains its attributes and modes as effects, so the higher con- 

 cepts contain the lower, and so also the premises contain the 

 conclusion. On the side of empiricism, the association of ideas, 



