CHAPTER IV 



THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY OF IDEAS 



Some remarkable illustrations of the doctrines set forth in the 

 preceding chapters are connected with the representative theory 

 of ideas, or 'epistemological dualism,' as it has latterly been 

 called. And so, though this theory is by no means universally 

 accepted by the old dogmatists, we think it important to give 

 some analysis of it, and to show its relation to rationalism and 

 empiricism respectively. A general definition of the theory, 

 which will apply with perfect justice to all of the various forms 

 which it has taken, probably cannot be given. But an approxi- 

 mation, which will serve to introduce the present brief survey, 

 may be based upon the following statement : 



The things of which we have knowledge are not, as known, 

 themselves present to consciousness, but are represented by ideas, 

 with which they stand in a relation which is external to both or, 

 at least, to the things. 



By the concluding words it is implied, that, whatever the rela- 

 tion denoted by 'representation' may be, it neither is, nor affects, 

 any part of the essential nature of the thing or (generally speak- 

 ing) of the idea. The idea may be completely analyzed without 

 betraying the existence of the thing ; and the thing may exist in 

 the full possession of its attributes though no idea of it ever arises. 

 The correctness (truth, adequacy) of the idea and the 'cog- 

 nizedness' of the thing are purely accidental. The words, "as 

 known," imply that even an idea, in order to become object of 

 knowledge, must be represented in consciousness by an idea of 

 itself. 



The simplest form of the theory, and the one from which all 

 others are divergences, is that the idea is like the thing. This 

 does not mean that the acceptance of an idea as correct is held 



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