Of I ME 



UNIVERSITY 



OF 



ENTATIVE THEORY OF IDEAS 59 



affirm, are at the same time the relations between the corre- 

 sponding things. So that, in so far as the relations are concerned 

 and it is only by reason of their relations that ideas represent 

 things at all the judgments may be said to refer to, or to 

 represent, the things as directly as the ideas. 



So long as empiricism holds to the representative theory, its 

 point of departure is the assumption, that the thing is the source 

 (or cause) of the perception that initially represents it in con- 

 sciousness any representation by an 'image' being due to the 

 fact that this is a revival or copy of the perception. This as- 

 sumption is as natural, as apparently inevitable, from the empiri- 

 cal standpoint, as the doctrine of parallelism is from the rational- 

 istic standpoint. It will be remembered that Descartes alone 

 among the rationalists is willing to admit a causal connection 

 between thing and idea, and even he regards it as a mystery sur- 

 passing human understanding. But for Locke and his more 

 direct followers the assumption is unquestionable. 



Whether, then, the perception resembles the thing is a com- 

 paratively small matter. It is believed to do so in the case of 

 sensations derived from more than one sense also in that of 

 solidity. The other sensations seem to be wholly different from 

 those features of the thing which cause them to arise in us. But 

 they represent the thing no less adequately on that account. 

 For their representative function depends upon the axiom, that 

 every difference between effects must be due to a difference in 

 their causes. It is important to note that this axiom is far from 

 justifying the inference, that all relations between ideas are iden- 

 tical with the relations between their objects. Indeed, the em- 

 piricists are well aware of some striking evidences to the contrary. 

 Darkness is the absence of light; but black is not the mere ab- 

 sence of brightness or of color, but a peculiar positive sensation. 

 The consequence is that a judgment, representing the relation 

 between two ideas, cannot however adequate the ideas may be 

 be understood as referring directly to things. The cleft be- 



