ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 99 



It was in the domain of philosophical thought, that Hegel 

 found the richest exemplification of his theory. The creation of 

 a philosophy was, in his view, as impossible as the creation of' a 

 political constitution and this for reasons which have already 

 been set forth. The advancement of knowledge could not consist 

 in the mere addition of new to old. For by reason of the essen- 

 tiality of relations the mastery of concepts, the insight into 

 things, is inevitably interpenetrating. A complete knowledge of 

 any object, a complete comprehension of any concept, would 

 amount to omniscience no possible addition would remain. 

 What happens, therefore, is that our abstract and palpably in- 

 adequate notions of things gradually gain in concreteness. The 

 old truth becomes the new, when hitherto unperceived conditions 

 and limitations of its applicability are revealed. It must then 

 be regarded as refuted, so far as its former pretensions to absolute 

 universality are concerned ; but this refutation means that it has 

 found its due place in a larger scheme of truth. 



It is this conception which enabled Hegel to organize a new 

 department of human knowledge one which Bacon two hundred 

 years before had described as wanting, but the lack of which 

 had not yet been supplied the history of philosophy. We have 

 already remarked that to the thinkers of the dogmatic period 

 the striking feature in the succession of world-theories is the in- 

 consistency of each one with every other. It is a lamentable 

 series of failures, to which the ultimate touch of pathos is given 

 by the curious vanity with which each man hopes to finally 

 triumph where all his predecessors have met defeat. Hegel sees 

 matters in a different light. To him the refutation of a system 

 means simply that the peculiar limitations of its principles are 

 perceived, and that they are accordingly included in and sub- 

 ordinated to principles that are at once more comprehensive and 

 more concrete. The catalogue of the philosophers and schools 

 of the past is in truth the index of an inspiring record of progress ; 

 and the relation of the latest thinker to those who have preceded 

 him should be one of gratitude and reverence. While he may 



