102 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



philosophy as Hegel is reported to have said 1 to show in detail 

 "how far the gradual evolution of his theme coincides with, or 

 swerves from, the dialectical unfolding of the pure logical idea." 

 There is another general feature of Hegel's logic, which we 

 must not neglect to emphasize. In his view, it is the lower cate- 

 gory itself, which, by reason of its own inherent character, de- 

 velops into the higher. No outside influence plays any part in 

 the process. It is not necessary for us to think about being, to 

 compare it or contrast it with any other category, or even to use 

 it in any concrete connection, in order to produce the dialectic 

 All that is mere ' 'external reflection." Above all, no induction 

 is necessary. It is not as if the category were an hypothesis 

 accepted provisionally and gradually corrected as its application 

 to new instances requires. On the contrary, it is accepted with- 

 out reservation it fills the mind's whole horizon and then, 

 without extraneous interference of any sort, it corrects itself. 

 It is only necessary that being be thought that is to say, that the 

 thought named 'being' continue and it transforms itself into 

 naught and into becoming. The dialectic is an expression of the 

 thought's own essential spontaneity. 



It will be readily seen from the above, how vital to Hegel's 

 system the assumption of pure thought as a particular species 

 of conscious activity is. He is unable to speak without contempt 

 of those who pretend to philosophize and yet deny the existence 

 of such thought. The denial is to him a mere confession that 

 the one who makes it is so far undeveloped as to be incapable of 

 the study of logic, and so of any philosophical speculation worthy 

 of the name. Not that this is his only answer. In his Phenome- 

 nology of Spirit he attempts to show that pure thought (as well as 

 concrete thought, of which later) is a necessary development 

 from the very lowest sensuous consciousness. From this position 

 he does not swerve, and his whole system of philosophy is con- 

 ditioned by it. 



1 In an editorial addition to Encyclopedia, Logic, 86; Wallace tr. 



