ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 105 



exhibits explicitly. So conceived, it shows two stages, the philos- 

 ophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. These two stages, 

 with the logic, are a reflective recapitulation of the dialectic of 

 actuality itself. For nature is nothing else than the negation of 

 thought thought objectified, 'petrified' (in Schelling's phrase), 

 representing in an external way the same dialectic which the 

 logic sets forth. The many permanent natural forms are ar- 

 rested developments corresponding to the various stages of the 

 evolution of the pure 'idea.' (This is why, for example, the 

 categories of the old rationalism were fairly competent in the 

 realm of mere mechanics, but failed altogether when applied 

 to the explanation of the simplest organism.) Spirit is the return 

 of nature to thought again in man: first as a thinking subject; 

 then in the thought-suffused institutions of human society ; and 

 finally in the forms, at once subjective and objective, of art, 

 religion, and philosophy. Philosophy, as the outcome of the 

 entire threefold dialectic, is the supremely actual. In other 

 words, God is in very truth the spirit of philosophy. 



Upon its face, absolute idealism is the reverse of rationalism. 

 Its procedure, instead of being a descent from first r premises 

 which are severally clear and distinct and absolutely true, and 

 impart their truth to all that follows from them, is an ascent 

 from thoughts which, as they stand, are unclear and inadequate; 

 and its fundamental principle is its goal. It would be difficult 

 to imagine an opposition more extreme. Accordingly, the popu- 

 lar usage which has grouped absolute idealism with philosophies 

 of the Cartesian type under the one name of rationalism may well 

 seem inexcusable. It is our conviction, nevertheless, that in 

 various important respects the popular classification is amply 

 justified; and that the absolute idealist, despite his courageous 

 struggle for spiritual liberty, has not succeeded in getting himself 

 free from the meshes of the old dogmatism. 



What has usually figured as the main ground of distinction 

 between the Hegelian philosophy and the pre-Kantian rationalism 



