ABSOLUTE IDEALISM III 



on the other hand, the establishment of new external relations. 

 In other words, it means the solution of problems in terms which 

 themselves raise new problems. For the externality of a relation 

 signifies simply the existing limit of our knowledge every rela- 

 tion is external until we have explained it. Whether any rela- 

 tions are absolutely 1 "external that is, whether there are any 

 absolute limits to our understanding, any problems that are in- 

 trinsically insoluble and hence not worth the setting is a ques- 

 tion which we need not discuss here. It will be granted, we 

 think, that the idealization of thought by a sweeping-away of its 

 limitations the conception of a problem-solving function, which 

 has no problems left to solve is scarcely adequate as a model 

 of correct thinking. 



The 'concrete universal' has been Hegel's most important sug- 

 gestion to later thinkers one whose fruitfulness has not yet 

 been exhausted. But the theory of the actual as a concrete 

 universal, is, when taken in perfect strictness, as nearly as possible 

 unilluminating. Its whole attractiveness is due to the analogy 

 of finite organisms. In the case of the finite organism, it is 

 possible to see that part in the light of the whole but only 

 because the whole is itself a part of a larger whole. 1 For the 

 conception of an organism is wholly relative to the conception of 

 an environment. This is the simple sun-clear truth that Hegel 

 never saw. It is only with reference to the environment that 

 there can be any comprehensible unity of the whole organism, 

 to which the functions of the various organs are subservient. 



^haftesbury's quaint observation is worth remembering: "When we reflect 

 on any ordinary frame or constitution either of art or nature ; and consider how hard 

 it is to give the least account of a particular part, without a competent knowledge 

 of the whole: we need not wonder to find ourselves at a loss in many things relating 

 to the constitution and frame of nature herself. For to what end in nature many 

 things, even whole species of creatures, refer; or to what purpose they serve; will 

 be hard for any one justly to determine: but to what end the many proportions 

 and various shapes of parts in many creatures actually serve; we are able by the 

 help of study and observation, to demonstrate with great exactness." An Inquiry 

 concerning Virtue, I, 2, i. 



