124 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



half succeeded ; that conceptions and methods inherited from the 

 dogmatic empiricism of the eighteenth century go far to vitiate 

 the evolutionary empiricism of today; and that the critical re- 

 vision of these inherited notions from an evolutionary standpoint 

 will make of pragmatism a far less iconoclastic movement. 



Our first endeavor must be to present a brief and simple out- 

 line of the central doctrines, permitting ourselves only so much 

 criticism as may be necessary to clearness of exposition. We 

 begin by summarizing the elementary facts and conclusions of 

 functional psychology, which pragmatism has taken as its point 

 of departure. 



The conception of consciousness as an instrument lies very 

 close to the fundamental principles of the Darwinian theory. 

 Like every other character of complex living organisms, con- 

 sciousness has had its history and presumably its origin. How, 

 indeed, it first arose is one of the unfathomed mysteries. But, 

 both in its first appearance and in the general course of its later 

 development, it must have possessed a survival-value which deter- 

 mined its persistence amid the universal struggle for existence. 

 The determination of this survival-value is a matter of consider- 

 able interest far more so than any speculation as to a possible 

 origin. Not the accident or series of accidents, through which 

 consciousness as a variation took its rise, but the utility which 

 led to its selection and perpetuation that is the matter of vital 

 scientific concern. 



The peculiar survival-value of consciousness appears to consist 

 in the fact that it provides a more minute adjustment of reaction 

 to external stimulus than is afforded by any other organic 

 agency. This superiority, again, depends very intimately 

 upon the learning-process. By reason of this process exist- 

 ing correlations may, if they prove insufficient, be promptly 

 modified in accordance with the needs of the organism. It 

 is true that suggestive analogies to the learning-process may 

 be pointed out in the field of inorganic chemistry, as well 



