THE PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATISM 131 



What becomes of the conception of an absolute knowledge 

 of beliefs possessed of absolute truth? It acquires the potent 

 significance of an ideal limit. For the change of human beliefs 

 is by no means altogether a mere fluctuation. In great part, 

 it shows itself to be a gradual convergence ; and this is especially 

 true of the history of the sciences. Now a convergence may be 

 conceived as having a finite terminus or as proceeding ad infini- 

 tum. In the case of the progress of knowledge, however, it is 

 hard to see how the attainment of a terminus could be sufficiently 

 attested. For it has happened repeatedly, that beliefs which 

 for centuries have been regarded as possessing a certainty which 

 nothing could surpass, are found to require correction. Never- 

 theless it may be admitted, that if a considerable body of science 

 should remain for a great length of time without modification, 

 men would feel obliged as they have felt under similar circum- 

 stances in the past to regard such knowledge as ultimate. But 

 from the vantage ground of the opening twentieth century, it 

 seems far more natural to regard scientific progress as the con- 

 vergence upon a goal which will never be definitely reached. 

 The question whether the goal is attainable or not, is a question, 

 which, from the present standpoint of science, leaves the meaning 

 of the goal unaffected ; for its attainment is beyond any reason- 

 able expectation. Absolute truth is truth incapable of correc- 

 tion. Whether such truth can be secured, only time can tell. 1 



The pragmatist theory of reality offers serious difficulty to 

 the expositor, and that for two reasons. In the first place, its 

 most distinguished advocates are also believers in humanism or 

 immediatism or both ; and while they generally endeavor to keep 

 these theories apart, human nature forbids that they should in- 

 variably succeed. In the second place, there is, we believe, a 

 frequent ambiguity even in the definitely pragmatist usage of the 



a This holds as a general statement of the pragmatist position in the matter. 

 We shall hereafter have occasion to call attention to a class of absolutely true 

 beliefs, which Mr. James believes to be even now entertained by us. Our belief 

 that two and one make three is an example. 



