THE PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATISM 133 



distinction between relative and absolute reality is thus a reflec- 

 tive afterthought. Absolute reality is the object of absolute 

 knowledge the unattained standard, which, if it were present 

 to us, would, indeed, afford an ultimate test of truth or falsity. 

 The conception is therefore, like that of absolute knowledge, 

 based upon the experienced development of human beliefs. 



The leading pragmatists are unanimous in protesting against 

 the charge of subjectivism, which their critics have, with almost 

 equal unanimity, brought against them. With respect to the 

 continued existence of sensible things, when not perceived by us, 

 they declare that they regard this as the best supported of all 

 human inferences. And the answer to the occasional charge of 

 solipsism is precisely similar. 



Reality in its other aspect, as the condition of success or failure, 

 is assuredly no new discovery of the pragmatists. Their merit 

 or crime, if you please is that they have insisted upon the essen- 

 tiality of this aspect, instead of regarding it as a mere 'external' 

 property. While philosophy and common sense have always 

 been agreed that reality makes a great difference to us, the 

 pragmatists have made themselves conspicuous by maintaining 

 that nothing is real except in so far as it makes a difference 

 to us. 



This doctrine should be carefully distinguished from the theory 

 of the will-to-believe, as well as from the allied theory of human- 

 ism; and we hope that our treatment of these two theories will 

 make the difference clear. Here we can only call attention to 

 the fact, that in conceiving reality as the condition of happiness, 

 nothing is implied as to any function of desire in legitimizing 

 belief, or as to the efficacy of human desires in changing a 'plastic' 

 reality. Nor is the pragmatist theory of reality a mere optimism. 

 So far from suggesting that evil realities do not exist, it suggests 

 very forcibly that they do exist, and declares that the evilness 

 of such realities is an essential factor in constituting them as 

 real. . 



The whole line of thought may be comprehended in the single 



