CHAPTER II 



EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 



We have confessed to an extensive agreement with the pragma- 

 tist theories set forth above. Whether the agreement be regarded 

 as a fundamental one, will doubtless depend upon the point of 

 view. It is natural for us to regard as fundamental in pragma- 

 tism the portion of truth which we find there. The pragmatists 

 themselves may easily think otherwise. How important the 

 agreement is, may be judged from the criticisms which we offer 

 here. 



A serious weakness in this system, as we conceive it, may be 

 traced to a certain peculiar assumption which has apparently 

 been inherited from the biological ethics of the last generation, 

 an assumption which pragmatism ought, indeed, to have been 

 the first to denounce. This is, that the whole utility or, at 

 least, the ultimate utility of a newly arising function consists 

 in its supplementation of previously existing functions, in the 

 accomplishment of previously existing ends. In reliance upon this 

 assumption, a previous generation of evolutionists attempted to 

 discover a 'sanction' for morality in the general characteristics 

 of prehuman evolution; and the present theory follows a simi- 

 lar course with respect to logical thought and consciousness in 

 general. 



That pragmatism ought to have rejected such an assumption 

 will appear, when it is reflected that it is a form of that very 

 doctrine of logical priority, the denial of which is vital to the 

 whole revolt against dogmatic absolutism. To assume that new 

 ends must be interpreted simply as means to old ones or, at 

 most, as new elements in old ends, upon a par with the rest is 

 to give up the whole instrumentalist position without a struggle. 

 It is to grant to the final ends a species of finality, for which no 

 place should now be left. 



