EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 137 



to the repetition or continuance of its cause; and secondarily any 

 link in the chain of events leading from the cause to the effect; 

 or briefly, to use a well-worn phrase, an effect determining its 

 cause. Now it is obvious that in relation to organic functions 

 transmitted by reproduction, the survival of the species stands 

 as such an end. If it is not secured, they cease to be; and it is 

 thus a permanent condition in accordance with which their 

 evolution has come to pass. In a general way this applies as 

 well to consciousness as to any other organic function. 



With regard to at least certain of the particular forms of con- 

 sciousness ideas, sentiments, and the like a very different ac- 

 count must be given; for, as is well known, these are not per- 

 petuated in the same manner, and accordingly their development 

 is quite otherwise determined. To be sure, such mental processes 

 are necessarily the outgrowth of inherited capacities, and these 

 must be maintained by an unbroken heredity if the whole function 

 is not to disappear. But within the limit thus assigned so definite 

 and extensive a variation has occurred, that to speak of survival 

 in the biologist's sense as the end of consciousness is a monstrous 

 distortion of the facts. 



For in the rise of consciousness a second end (in the sense above 

 defined) emerges, namely, the satisfaction of desire, or happiness. 

 That happiness does thus operate as a determining condition in 

 the psychical selection by which the more complex mental proc- 

 esses are developed, is well known; and none have illustrated the 

 fact better than the pragmatists. Their fault, as we conceive it, 

 has been a failure to distinguish accurately between the condi- 

 tions of happiness and those of survival. This has led to a 

 distressing ambiguity in the use of such terms as 'need,' 'adjust- 

 ment,' 'failure,' 'working,' etc., referring to the presence or ab- 

 sence of both classes of conditions at once an ambiguity which 

 has done more to prevent a wide acceptance of pragmatism 

 than any other single circumstance. 



In urging the necessity of keeping ourselves clear upon this 

 point, we do not wish to suggest a questioning of the pragmatist 



