EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 139 



ness interferes, and that when a readjustment is accomplished 

 it retires, has real significance only for the most rudimentary 

 conscious processes. As applied to more complex processes, it is 

 a mere tautology; for, in that case, adjustment and failure of 

 adjustment no longer refer to the conditions of survival, but to 

 the expression of volitional tendencies whose relation to survival 

 is practically undetermined. 



A further advantage to pragmatism is contained in the fact 

 that it now becomes feasible to include thought-activities as such 

 under the term 'behavior' or 'conduct.' So long as conduct was 

 conceived to be essentially determined by its relation to survival, 

 such inclusion was not practicable; since it is not clear how in 

 general a conscious process as such, or the neural process corre- 

 lated therewith, is capable of modifying the situation of an organ- 

 ism in such a way as to improve its chances of survival. A mere 

 thought cannot ward off a blow or repair expended energies. 

 And so, if a thought was to be regarded as conduct, it was neces- 

 sarily in a modified and secondary sense, namely as a contribut- 

 ing cause to conduct proper, i. e., directed physical movements. 

 Mental procedure must then be interpreted as a succession of 

 attitudes, of preparations for action like the crouch of the cat 

 making ready to spring. Unfortunately, scientific procedure has 

 commonly no conscious reference to overt action; and when its 

 significance for the guidance of such action is made clear, the 

 relation is not to any particular situation or any particular re- 

 sponse. But when conduct is defined in relation to a state of 

 consciousness, such as satisfaction, the difficulty no longer re- 

 mains. It is only necessary that a specific interest be taken in 

 the issue of the thought-activity as such the solution of a mathe- 

 matical problem, for example apart from any expected effect 

 upon later physical movements ; and this is so far from being 

 inconceivable, that it is a familiar daily experience. 







But is it correct to say that happiness, as such, is the deter- 

 minant of intellectual progress and the ultimate term to which the 



