144 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



fort is on a par with the expected, but unavoidable failure of an- 

 other. Moreover while it is true that within wide limits the course 

 of scientific progress is determined by all manner of human inter- 

 ests, yet in detail it is the specific interest in truth that is of deter- 

 mining importance. The statement, that the true is that which, 

 now and in the long run, is the expedient in thinking, is doubtless 

 correct of truth in general, but it may be absolutely false as 

 applied to any particular truth. That may amount simply to 

 an increase of misery. 1 



A second ground of complaint which we find against the prag- 

 matists is that in their inductive study of the meaning of truth 

 proceeding, it will be remembered, by an analysis of the process 

 of change of belief they deliberately ignore a distinction, which 

 has existed from the earliest recorded times, between warranted 

 and unwarranted change of belief. They deliberately ignore it, 

 apparently because they believe that to give it recognition would 

 unduly prejudice in advance the results of their investigation. 

 Pragmatism stands, above all else, for open-mindedness and can- 

 dor, and wishes to be, as far as possible, unhampered by tra- 

 ditional canons of truth. We believe that in this matter its 

 apostles have overreached themselves. 



The following sentences from Pragmatism will sufficiently illus- 

 trate our meaning. "Of whatever temperament a professional 

 philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact 

 of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recog- 

 nized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his con- 

 clusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias 

 than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the 

 evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more senti- 

 mental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as 



*It is fair to note that Professor Dewey has protested against the identification 

 of his own view with the one here criticized. "I have never identified any satis- 

 faction with the truth of an idea, save that satisfaction which arises when the idea 

 as working hypothesis or tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a 

 way as to fulfill what it intends." Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 

 Methods, Vol. V, p. 94. 



