EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 147 



7. We believe, with Mr. James, that in no department of 

 science is the complete elimination of the individual factor prob- 

 able ; but this does not affect the question whether such elimina- 

 tion, so far as it is possible, is a distinct desideratum. At the 

 same time it is worthy of remark that a vast body of knowledge 

 exists, in which the process has gone so far that the individual 

 factor is very difficult to detect; nay, that there are fields in 

 which we are not in a position to demonstrate it in any detail, 

 and can at most only infer its existence from very general con- 

 siderations. This is notably the case with the mathematical 

 sciences, which are, and have been, almost universally accepted 

 as absolute truth. But, aside from these sciences, the desidera- 

 tum of universal acceptability has been progressively realized. 

 To be sure, as science advances, more and more questions are 

 raised that can as yet be answered only as temperament suggests ; 

 and there are also questions which have vexed men for ages, and 

 which, so far as we are aware, have never been put in the way of a 

 universally acceptable solution. But it remains true that in- 

 creasing numbers of problems, and even whole realms of specu- 

 lation, where tastes and whims formerly reigned supreme 

 philology, for example have been brought into an orderly sub- 

 jection to principles of generally recognized cogency. 



It appears to us that these considerations are sufficient to 

 show that the lack of recognition of temperament as an evidence 

 of philosophical truth is not due to any mere prejudice. The 

 cause certainly lies deeper. As we have previously remarked, 

 a larger induction with respect to the conditions of belief, one 

 which embraced, not simply the causes which might at any time 

 produce belief, but those which were confirmed by reflective 

 criticism, would have led to a more trustworthy theory of truth. 

 There is something admirably bold in the philosophical enterprise 

 which is committed to "no rigid canons of what shall count as 

 proof." But the actual procedure of the pragmatist makes the 

 distinction between proof and sophistry, between argument and 

 persuasion, not simply uncertain but altogether illusory. 



