1 68 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



process? Such a process results, as has been shown, in the 

 forming of a distinction between two stimuli formerly undis- 

 tinguished and reacted to in the same way. Now the fact that 

 the two stimuli have come to be recognized as different, may not 

 at all imply any analysis of either stimulus. The difference 

 between them may be felt simply as a difference on the whole. 

 But such a type of consciousness can have but a limited sphere 

 of usefulness. If the animal can profit by more complex and 

 varied behavior, then a more developed type of cognitive control 

 is of evident advantage. Thus if the food of the animal be a 

 living creature, which can safely be attacked in some situations, 

 but which it is better to avoid in other situations, it is of impor- 

 tance that the situation be differentiated into prey and significant 

 circumstances. Still more necessary is it that the prey be dis- 

 criminated as distinct from its surroundings, if the most advan- 

 tageous mode of attack varies with change of situation. But 

 until a stage is reached where it is of decided advantage to behave 

 differently toward prey under different circumstances, there is 

 no reason why the prey should itself be recognized as a distinct 

 object. It becomes an object for the consciousness of the animal, 

 only in so far as it is discriminated as an element in a total com- 

 plex situation. From the standpoint of biological utility, it is 

 clear that the object, so far from meaning a definite type of behavior, 

 is recognized as an object only as it is associated with important 

 diversity of behavior in characteristically different situations. 



The emergence of the object marks a critical stage in the de- 

 velopment of conscious life. Its importance lies fundamentally 

 in the indirectness which the cognitive control of conduct now 

 assumes. Broadly speaking, it is the indirectness of the reference 

 of cognitive experience to conduct, that, on the one hand, makes 

 it so efficient an instrument of control, and, on the other hand, 

 gives thought its distinctive character. Regarded from this 

 standpoint, the whole development of conscious life may be 

 characterized as an increasing indirectness in the control of con- 

 duct. More specifically, the emergence of the object means the 



