THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS 169 



emergence of a set of constant elements into which new situations 

 may be resolved. Instead of experience falling into a succession 

 of stimuli related to each other as simply alike on the whole and 

 different on the whole, it now falls into a succession of complex 

 presentations, containing constant factors in new and varying 

 combinations. The identity of these factors gives a continuity 

 to experience which was impossible before. As a result of this, 

 the learning-process becomes a far more efficient means of adapta- 

 tion. The discovery of the proper response to a new situation 

 need no longer be a matter of sheer chance. The new situation, 

 if it contain familiar objects, tends to stimulate not simply one 

 habitual response but the whole group of conditional responses 

 which the object represents. Thus if one response fails, an alter- 

 native is ready. Foresight is immeasurably extended. In pro- 

 portion as the concept of the object gains in variety of associa- 

 tions, the individual becomes correspondingly fertile of resources 

 in the face of new conditions. 



So much for the significance of the concept of the object in 

 reference to conduct its value, or, as we have termed it, its 

 import. The increase in complexity, the indirectness of the refer- 

 ence to conduct, which we have pointed out, is correlative to a 

 corresponding development on the side of content. The content 

 is made up, on the one hand, of distinctions between the object 

 and the situation and of its quasi-logical connections with other 

 objects from which it must be discriminated. As in the case of 

 the simpler sense-impression, these connections include the dif- 

 ferences between the given object and other objects, together 

 with the more general likeness equally recognized as subsisting 

 between them; for objects, like simple sense-impressions, come 

 to be discriminated as possessing differences only in so far as 

 there is a tendency to confuse them under certain conditions. 

 This confusion may arise simply from a lack of sufficient atten- 

 tion; or it may be that two objects remain indistinguishable 

 under some conditions, and that a change of condition is necessary 

 to enable their differences to become discernible. On the other 



