MILL'S THEORY OF OBJECTIVITY 179 



step more needed to account for the belief in the existence of an 

 external world as a realm of being wholly independent of ex- 

 perience that is, for the rise of ontological dualism. This step 

 is taken, when we recognize the tendency of the mind to generalize 

 illegitimately by applying to a whole class of things what holds 

 of each member of the class considered separately. Thus, be- 

 cause each group of possibilities possesses a certain independence 

 with reference to the actual realization of any of the particular 

 possibilities that constitute it, considered singly, the group comes 

 to be regarded as absolutely independent of any actual experience 

 whatever an inference which is, of course, wholly unwarranted. 

 The same thing may be otherwise expressed by saying that the 

 ideal character of the object is forgotten, and it is accounted as 

 possessing in itself a reality properly ascribable (according to 

 Mill's presuppositions) only to the sensation as such. 



Let us now pass to the consideration of the more common 

 criticisms of Mill's position. First, there is the charge, that the 

 theory logically commits Mill to a form of realism. One cannot 

 stop, it is argued, with the statement, that the object is a possi- 

 bility of sensation. There can be no such thing as a mere possi- 

 bility, for every real possibility must have a basis in actuality. 

 For the object to be a permanent possibility of sensation, it 

 must exist as actual in some form. The phrase may be an 

 adequate description of what the object is known as; but, if it is 

 anything more than a mere idea, it must exist as something 

 actual, even though the nature of that actuality be inscrutable 

 to us. The dilemma is perfect. If the object has a permanent 

 existence, it cannot be reduced to an idea, for all ideas are m- 

 permanent. If, on the other hand, it is a real possibility, it 

 must exist as an actuality; but the only actualities that Mill 

 admits are ideas. 



That this criticism is based upon a misunderstanding of Mill's 

 real position will, we believe, be evident upon consideration. 

 It seems to rest upon a certain confusion in regard to the meaning 

 of the term 'possibility.' This is a word that is commonly used 



