1 82 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



velopment that their nature can be defined. A better illustration 

 of Mill's theory than any which he himself gives may perhaps 

 be found in the forms of musical composition except that it 

 may suggest too forcibly the social factor in psychological de- 

 velopment, of which he took but little account. These forms 

 have formerly been supposed to be a priori with respect to musical 

 experience; universally valid for all mankind, and, while perhaps 

 only gradually arising to self-consciousness in the individual, 

 nevertheless operative in moulding his whole perception of melody 

 and harmony from the outset. As thus conceived, they furnish 

 a striking analogy to the Kantian forms of experience in general. 

 It is now commonly admitted that musical forms are, both in 

 the individual and in society, a product of evolution, and that 

 this evolution is still in progress, although to the modern man 

 they may appear to be as absolute as the law of gravitation. 

 The musical forms are then typical of all the forms of experience 

 which Mill admits. If it be asked, whether music has not an 

 a priori basis in the sense of generic characteristics of tonal per- 

 ception, by which the whole evolution of the forms has been 

 conditioned, the disciple of Mill may well answer in the affirma- 

 tive. But such characteristics of the perception are nothing more 

 than empirically discovered psychological uniformities. And in 

 precisely similar fashion he can admit no other basis for the 

 forms of experience in general than psychological laws. 



Our own criticism of Mill strikes deeper, as we think. It is 

 the dogmatic presuppositions of his theory that we would call 

 in question. His departure is from the simple elements of sensa- 

 tion and imagination, held together by various modes of 'external' 

 association (which do not affect the character of the elements 

 connected). To these he adds memory and expectation, which 

 are 'real' connections, through which a present state of conscious- 

 ness involves in itself a belief in the past or future existence of 

 another state, with which the former is in some wise continuous. 

 But he is so far from attempting to reconcile the existence of 

 these 'real' connections with the simplicity and independence of 



