MILL'S THEORY OF OBJECTIVITY. 187 



aroused processes, no new mode of exerting it is introduced. It is 

 true that in the guidance of overt conduct the percept remains 

 (except, perhaps, in abnormal cases) an essential factor. Control 

 by 'mere ideas' is lunacy. It is true also, that the percept makes, 

 in general, a more forcible appeal to the emotions than does the 

 idea. The sight of the proffered coin is a powerful inducement 

 to the hesitating vendor. But these admissions do not touch 

 the heart of the matter. As from the structural standpoint there 

 is no fundamental difference between percept and idea simply 

 a difference in the proportion of externally and centrally excited 

 elements so from the functional standpoint there is no funda- 

 mental difference in the mode of control which they exercise upon 

 conduct. 



Is it possible that the disagreement here indicated is merely 

 verbal? We think not. Mr. James has described the "kind of 

 knowledge called perception" as one in which the knower and 

 the known are "the self -same piece of experience taken twice 

 over in different contexts." 1 True, perception does not mean for 

 him necessarily the perception of things as things, i. e., as having 

 an existence beyond the moment of their presence in conscious- 

 ness. This is a piece of interpretation for which a somewhat 

 extensive previous experience is necessary. But, if we under- 

 stand Mr. James aright, this interpretation is not supposed to 

 alter the nature of the percept as such. The child's earliest 

 perception was (presumably) a perception of things that is to 

 say, the percepts had an existence beyond the moment of per- 

 ception though the perceiver did not know it. This position 

 (which is substantially the same as Hume's) we believe to be 

 clearly false and to have been sufficiently refuted by J. S. Mill. 

 But we further hold that, even if this position were correct, 

 nevertheless the percepts have meaning substantially as ideas 

 have, and are similarly open to criticism as correct or incorrect. 

 This would involve the paradoxical conclusion, that things are 

 correct or incorrect but we are not responsible for that. 



l The Meaning of Truth, p. 103. 



