THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS 189 



noticeable in its behavior, and we have the beginnings of classifi- 

 cation. The child at such a stage recognizes a certain resem- 

 blance between all children, which it does not recognize between 

 children and adults ; for, in spite of the differences in its behavior 

 toward individual children, its attitude toward any child is char- 

 acteristically different from its attitude toward adults. Further- 

 more, the recognition of this general resemblance develops pari 

 passu with the recognition of individual differences. There is 

 no grouping of children together until particular children come 

 to be distinguished. But that there is a grouping, which is 

 correlative to the growth of individual distinctions, seems evident. 



As general conditions for the formation of the earliest class 

 concepts, we find, first, a failure to distinguish between a number 

 of objects, which are, however, distinguished from other objects; 

 second, the emergence of a distinction between one or more of 

 the objects in question and others of the number, which is valu- 

 able for certain purposes or in certain situations, while it still 

 remains of advantage to the individual to treat them similarly 

 except under these specific conditions. The mere failure to dis- 

 tinguish between them must, that is, be transformed into a posi- 

 tive recognition of their general resemblance, such recognition 

 being essential to their classification. These fundamental con- 

 ditions being fulfilled, the further development of the incipient 

 class concepts depends upon the conscious differentiation and 

 accentuation of this common character, effected by the focusing 

 of attention upon it. 



We are now ready to inquire what relation the general concept 

 bears to the more primitive concept of the simple object. In the 

 first place, like the latter it is an organization of associations, 

 actual or potential, and not a particular process. In other words 

 we have here to draw the same distinction between the general 

 concept and its psychological representative, the idea, that we 

 found necessary in the case of the simple object. If, however, 

 we compare the organization constituting the general concept 

 with that which constitutes the concept of the s'mple object, 



