1 90 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



we find a characteristic difference. The concept of the simple 

 object is an organization of various conditional possibilities of 

 experience which have become associated by virtue of their direct 

 functional relation to each other. In the general concept, how- 

 ever, we find an altered state of affairs. While the members of 

 this organization exhibit, indeed, a type of internal relationship 

 similar to that subsisting in the concept of the simple object, a 

 modification of structure has taken place under the operation 

 of what has traditionally been called 'association by similarity.' 1 

 The system is based, not simply upon the direct functional rela- 

 tion of the associated experiences to each other, but upon the 

 common significance for conduct of a variety of objects. What 

 may be called potential resemblances between objects become 

 actual, and general concepts of them are formed, only when some 

 interest attaches to the recognition of these resemblances and 

 attention is directed toward them. 



If these observations are correct, it would follow that the 

 earliest general concepts must be based, not upon specific and 

 definite similarities between objects, but upon relatively massive 

 and indefinite resemblances, such as would correspond to the 

 common significance for conduct of the objects associated. And 

 this is what seems to be the case with the general concepts of 

 children, as evidenced, for example, by their early attempts at 

 definition. Thus a child of three, when asked : "What is a train?" 

 replied: "A train is something to pull." Similarly, "A toy is to 

 play with," and, "A mamma is a lady to take care of me." 

 Students of pedagogy have compiled sets of definitions given by 

 children, which are similar in character. In these instances the 

 resemblances between the different objects belonging to the class 



psychological mechanism has, from the time of its first mention by Plato, 

 been regarded as separate and distinct from the so-called 'association by contiguity'; 

 and only in very recent times has the fundamental identity of the two modes of 

 connection become probable. It must be admitted that to the psychologist of 

 today 'association by similarity' is rather a name for a problem than a solution. 

 But however problematic the detailed analysis of this mode of association may be, 

 it has become evident that it belongs only to the most highly evolved types of 

 consciousness and is probably attributable only to man himself. 



